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Guaranteeing non-repudiation, unforgeability as well as transferability of a signature is one of the
most vital safeguards in today’s e-commerce era. Based on fundamental laws of quantum physics,
quantum digital signature (QDS) aims to provide information-theoretic security for this crypto-
graphic task. However, up to date, the previously proposed QDS protocols are impractical due to
various challenging problems and most importantly, the requirement of authenticated (secure) quan-
tum channels between participants. Here, we present the first quantum digital signature protocol
that removes the assumption of authenticated quantum channels while remaining secure against the
collective attacks. Besides, our QDS protocol can be practically implemented over more than 100
km under current mature technology as used in quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures aim to certify the provenance and
identity of a message as well as the authenticity of a
signature. They are widely applied in e-mails, financial
transactions, electronic contracts, software distribution
and so on. However, relying on mathematical complex-
ities, classical digital signature schemes become vulner-
able to quantum computing attacks. Though there are
some classical unconditionally secure signature schemes
[1–5], a resource-expensive assumption exists therein,
namely, the secure classical channels between the par-
ticipants. Quantum digital signature (QDS) bases on
fundamental laws of quantum physics to guarantee its
information-theoretic security. Since Gottesman and
Chuang proposed the first QDS protocol [6], a quantum
version of Lamport’s scheme [7], the following problems
appear therein: (P1) requiring the authenticated quan-
tum channels, (P2) the preparation and transmission of
complex one-way function quantum states, (P3) requir-
ing long-term quantum memory, and (P4) other chal-
lenging operations, such as performing SWAP test on
the states. A novel approach uses linear optics and pho-
ton detectors to circumvent the requirement for quantum
memory and complex state preparation [8] and replaces
the SWAP test with an optical multiport [9], yet lead-
ing to another challenging technology—long-distance sta-
bilization of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer [10]. Up
to date, an obviously serious problem left for a feasible
QDS protocol is the impractical assumption of the au-
thenticated quantum channels between participants be-
ing available.
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The authenticated quantum channels are equivalent to
the secure quantum channels that do not allow any eaves-
dropping. Recall that while quantum key distribution
(QKD) [11, 12] requires authenticated classical channels,
it does not require authenticated (secure) quantum chan-
nels because of potential eavesdropping. Actually, guar-
anteeing secure key distribution without authenticated
quantum channels is exactly the goal and definition of
QKD. Therefore, the assumption of authenticated quan-
tum channels has to be eliminated in a QDS to be of prac-
tical value. In this paper, using single-photon qubit state
and phase-randomized weak coherent states, we propose
the first QDS protocol that eliminates the impractical
assumption of secure quantum channels. Therefore, in
respect to tackling the security problem merely requiring
the authentication of classical communication, the basic
assumptions underlying our QDS protocol are similar to
that of QKD [11, 12] and multiparty quantum communi-
cation (quantum secret sharing) [13, 14].
We say a digital signature protocol is secure if it sat-
isfies [3]: unforgeability, non-repudiation and transfer-
ability. Unforgeability means that a given piece of mes-
sage indeed comes from the signer and remains intact
during transmission, namely, no one can forge a valid
signature that can be accepted by other honest recipi-
ents. Non-repudiation means that once the signer signs
a message, he/she cannot deny having signed it. Trans-
ferability means that when an honest recipient of the
signed message accepts a signature, other honest recip-
ients will accept it as well. We define a QDS scheme
to have εunf-unforgeability, representing that the prob-
ability for an adversary to create a valid signature is
not greater than εunf. Similarly, we say a protocol is
with εnor-non-repudiation when the probability for the
signer to repudiate a legitimate signature is not greater
than εnor. Thereby, a QDS protocol is defined to have
εsec-security when it satisfies both εunf-unforgeability and
εnor-non-repudiation, with εunf + εnor ≤ εsec. Consider-
2ing robustness, εrob is the probability that the protocol
will be aborted even with the absence of an adversary.
In this paper, we consider a simple and most impor-
tant case with three participants, i.e., one signer and two
recipients. Then the property of transferability becomes
equivalent to non-repudiation [6, 8]. The QDS protocols
using two copies of single-photon states and decoy-state
method are proposed in Sec. II and Sec. IV, with the
security analyzed in Sec. III.
II. QDS WITH TWO COPIES OF
SINGLE-PHOTON STATES
There are three stages when implementing our three-
participant QDS protocol, namely, the distribution stage,
the estimation stage and the messaging stage. We in-
troduce a two-photon six-state QDS protocol to illus-
trate our basic idea. There are six single-photon quan-
tum states, |H〉, |V 〉, |±〉 = (|H〉 ± |V 〉)/√2, |R〉 =
(|H〉 + i|V 〉)/√2 and |L〉 = (|H〉 − i|V 〉)/√2. The
six states can be arranged into twelve sets {|H〉, |+〉},
{|+〉, |V 〉}, {|V 〉, |−〉}, {|−〉, |H〉}, {|H〉, |R〉}, {|R〉, |V 〉},
{|V 〉, |L〉}, {|L〉, |H〉}, {|+〉, |R〉}, {|R〉, |−〉}, {|−〉, |L〉},
{|L〉, |+〉}, where the first state of each set represents
logic 0 and the second logic 1.
The distribution stage: For each possible future mes-
sage m = 0 and m = 1, Alice prepares two copies of a
sequence of N single-photon quantum states. For each
quantum state, Alice randomly chooses one of the twelve
sets and generates one of two non-orthogonal states in
the set. Afterwards, she sends one copy to Bob and
the other to Charlie through insecure (unauthenticated)
quantum channels. For each quantum state, Bob and
Charlie randomly and independently perform a polariza-
tion measurement with one of the three bases {Z,X, Y },
and store the corresponding classical bit. Bob and Char-
lie will announce the result if their detectors have no click,
and then Alice, Bob and Charlie will discard all the cor-
responding data and keep the leftM bits. For each quan-
tum state, Alice announces from which set she selects the
state through the authenticated classical channels. Bob
(Charlie) compares his measurement outcomes with the
two states. If his measurement outcome is orthogonal
to one of the states, he concludes that the other state
has been sent, which represents a conclusive result. Oth-
erwise, he concludes that it is an inconclusive outcome.
Let P cB (P
c
C) be the probability that Bob (Charlie) has a
conclusive result for each received quantum state; in the
ideal case, P cB = P
c
C = P
c = 1/6. Note that Bob and
Charlie do not announce whether they have a conclusive
outcome.
The estimation stage: The signer Alice chooses the
desired recipient, for example Bob, who will be the au-
thenticator in the messaging stage. Then Alice informs
the other recipient, Charlie, to randomly choose Mt bits
as the test bits used to estimate correlation (if Charlie is
the authenticator chosen by Alice, Alice will inform Bob
to randomly choose test bits as well). Charlie announce
the location of test bits and Alice publicly announces the
bit information of those test bits. Bob (Charlie) calcu-
lates the mismatching rate ecB (e
c
C) of conclusive results
from the test bits. When ecB or e
c
C gets too high, they
announce to abort the protocol. Besides, when P cB or
P cC shows a big deviation from the ideal value P
c = 1/6,
they also announce to abort the protocol. Otherwise,
Bob and Charlie announce the mismatching rate and the
probability, {ecB, P cB} and {ecC , P cC}, respectively. Alice,
Bob and Charlie only keep Mu untested bits, denoted by
SA, SB and SC .
The messaging stage: To sign one-bit messagem, Alice
sends the messagem and the corresponding bit string SA
to the authenticator, Bob. Bob checks the mismatching
rate P cBE
c
B between SA and SB, where E
c
B is the mis-
matching rate of the conclusive results. The inconclusive
outcomes are considered to match Alice’s announcement
bits automatically. If the mismatching rate EcB ≤ Ta (Ta
is the authentication security threshold), Bob accepts the
message. Otherwise, he rejects it and announces to abort
the protocol. After Bob accepts the message, he for-
wards it and the corresponding bit string SA to the veri-
fier Charlie. Charlie checks the mismatching rate P cCE
c
C
between SA and SC , where E
c
C is the mismatching rate of
the conclusive results. If the mismatching rate EcC ≤ Tv
(Tv is the verification security threshold), Charlie accepts
the forwarded message, otherwise he rejects it.
Note that the distribution stage is a quantum process,
while the estimation and messaging stage are classical
communication processes. The time interval between the
distribution stage and estimation stage is arbitrary. The
estimation stage is employed to estimate the parameters
Ta and Tv, which are used for the messaging stage. Af-
ter the distribution stage, once Alice wants to sign the
message, she will start the estimation stage and the mes-
saging stage. As Alice is the signer, she can identify the
one who is the desired recipient (namely the authentica-
tor) before the estimation stage. Therefore, the roles of
Bob and Charlie are equivalent, either of them can be
the receiver of the message and forwards it to the other.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the three-participant QDS protocol, at most one
participant can be an adversary, because the majority
vote is usually used to resolve the dispute [5, 8]. Then,
the only potential attack strategy can be either the repu-
diation of the signer or the forgery of the authenticator.
We are now interested in why our scheme can prevent
adversary’s attack without authenticated quantum chan-
nels. For Alice’s repudiation attack, authenticated quan-
tum channels cannot help her because the quantum states
are prepared by herself. During the estimation stage,
exploiting the random sampling theorem, one can esti-
mate the correlation strength between Bob’s and Char-
lie’s received quantum states. Therefore, the SWAP test
3FIG. 1. (color online). Practical implementation of the three-participant QDS protocols. Alice’s setups for Scheme I (II) are
shown respectively on the upper (lower) panel on the left. For the parts of Bob and Charlie, the setups are located on the right,
which are shared by both schemes. AM: amplitude modulator used to prepare decoy-state, PM: polarization modulator used
to prepare polarization states or active basis selection, BS: 50:50 beam splitter used to prepare two copies of quantum states,
PBS: polarization beam splitter, D1-D4: single-photon detectors.
and symmetry operation of Bob’s and Charlie’s quantum
states or classical bits can be removed in our protocol,
which are realized by authenticated quantum channels
[4, 6, 8–10, 15, 16] or secure classical channels [4, 5, 17]
in other protocols. For Bob’s forgery attack, exploit-
ing the random sampling theorem, Charlie can estimate
the correlation strength between the quantum states Al-
ice sends and those Charlie receives without authenti-
cated quantum channels, whereas in previous protocols,
authenticated quantum channels are required to guaran-
tee that one copy of the quantum state Charlie receives
has not been tampered with. Detailed security analysis
are shown in Appendix A.
When Bob forges, Alice and Charlie are automatically
regarded as honest. A successful forgery means that
the dishonest Bob forges (tampers) the message bit and
Charlie accepts it. Bob is unable to discriminate two
copies of six-state (or four-state) without any error, since
an unambiguous discrimination among C linearly depen-
dent qubit states is only possible when at least C − 1
copies of the states are available [18]. For this reason,
we can restrict Bob’s forgery attack even when quan-
tum channels are insecure. We consider the case that
Bob is restricted to collective forgery attack where his
optimal strategy is to acquire the information of each
quantum state Charlie receives as much as possible (ex-
ploiting quantum de Finetti theorem [19], we expect that
our scheme could guarantee the security against coher-
ent forgery attack, which should be studied in the future).
Thus, Bob’s attack strategy in the two-photon six-state
QDS protocol can be reduced to the eavesdropping attack
of Eve in the six-state SARG04-QKD protocol [20, 21]
given that the two-photon source is used. With the en-
tanglement distillation techniques [11, 21], we can obtain
the upper bound of Bob’s information IBC about Char-
lie’s conclusive-result bits as (see Appendix B)
IBC = H(ep|eb), ep = 2−
√
2
4
+
3
2
√
2
eb, (1)
where H(ep|eb) is the conditional Shannon entropy func-
tion; ep and eb are the phase and bit error rates, re-
spectively. If a bit is flipped, the probability of a phase
shift will be 4+
√
2
8 . In the QDS protocol, eb is the ex-
pectation value of mismatching rate between Alice’s bits
and Charlie’s conclusive results in the untested portion.
Therefore eb = e
c
C + δ1, δ1 is the finite sample size effect
which can be quantified by the random sampling without
replacement [22] with the failure probability ǫ1. In order
to optimally implement the forgery attack, Bob will at-
tempt to make the mismatching rate between his guessed
bits and Charlie’s conclusive-result bits reach the mini-
mum value Sc. Employing the properties of min-entropy
and max-entropy [19, 23], Sc can be given by
H(Sc) ≥ 1− IBC , (2)
where H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. There is no chance for Bob
to make a successful forgery in the ideal case when Char-
lie’s verification threshold satisfies Tv < Sc. However,
considering the sampling with finite number of indepen-
dent Bernoulli random values, the observed average value
can be less than the expectation value with a probabil-
ity quantified by the Chernoff bound [24, 25]. Thus, the
probability that Charlie accepts (CA) the message forged
by Bob is negligible as
ε1 = Pr(CA) ≤ exp[− (Sc − Tv)
2
2Sc
P cCMu], (3)
where P cCMu is the number of Charlie’s untested
conclusive-result bits.
When Alice repudiates, Bob and Charlie are automat-
ically regarded as honest. A successful repudiation hap-
pens when Alice disavows the signature, with the mes-
sage accepted by Bob and rejected by Charlie. Alice
must treat each quantum state received by both Bob
and Charlie in the same way since the conclusive re-
sults of quantum states they acquire are random, which
4is similar to Ref. [8]. Conclusive results of partial quan-
tum states can be acquired by Bob and Charlie simul-
taneously, which can be used in the estimation stage to
estimate the correlation strength between the quantum
states they receive. Thus, exploiting the technique intro-
duced in Ref. [8], our QDS scheme can guarantee security
against the coherent repudiation attack even if the sym-
metry operation (optical multiport) [8] is removed. Let
∆t (∆) be the mismatching rate between Bob’s and Char-
lie’s test (untested) bit string when they both have con-
clusive results. Let PB (PC) be the expectation value of
the mismatching rate between Alice’s and Bob’s (Char-
lie’s) untested bits. Due to random sampling, we have
∆t ≤ ecB+ecC , ∆t+δ2 = ∆ ≥ PC/P cC−PB/P cB, where δ2
is the finite sample size effect quantified by the random
sampling without replacement [22] with failure probabil-
ity ǫ2. When the two thresholds satisfy Tv > Ta+∆, the
probability that Bob accepts (BA) a message and Charlie
rejects (CR) it is negligible as
ε2 = Pr(BA,CR) = exp
[
− (A− P
c
BTa)
2
2A
Mu
]
, (4)
where A = PB is a physical solution of the following
equation and inequalities
(A− P cBTa)2
2A
=
[P cCTv − P cC (A/P cB +∆)]2
3P cC (A/P
c
B +∆)
,
P cBTa < A < P
c
B(Tv −∆).
(5)
The robustness quantifies the probability that Bob re-
jects (BR) a message with the absence of an adversary.
The probability can be given by
εrob = Pr(BR) <h[P
c
BMu, P
c
BMt, e
c
B, Ta − ecB],
h(n, k, λ, t) =
exp[− nkt22(n+k)λ(1−λ) ]C(n, k, λ)√
2πnkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) ,
C(n, k, λ) = exp
( 1
8(n+ k)
+
1
12k
− 1
12kλ+ 1
− 1
12k(1− λ) + 1
)
.
(6)
Detailed security analysis and calculation can be founded
in Appendix B.
IV. DECOY-STATE QDS
The above idea using two ideal single-photon sources
can be practically implemented by weak coherent states
with the decoy-state method [26, 27]. The schematic lay-
out of our practical QDS with phase-randomized weak
coherent states, Scheme I and II, are shown in Fig. 1.
Scheme I and Scheme II have a few additional parts than
the above two-photon six-state QDS scheme, i.e., decoy-
state modulation and announcement. In the distribution
stage of Scheme I, Alice exploits amplitude modulator
FIG. 2. (color online). Signature rates versus total se-
cure transmission distance. For simulation purposes, we
employ the following experimental parameters: the intrin-
sic loss coefficient of the ultralow-loss telecom fiber chan-
nel is 0.160 dB km−1 [22]. For superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors, the detection efficiency is 93% and
the dark count rate is 1.0 × 10−7 [28]. The quantum bit
error rate between Alice’s and Bob’s (Charlie’s) system is
E ≃ 1.0%. The ratio of random sampling is β = Mt/M =
30%. The security (robustness) bound is εsec < 1.0 × 10
−5
(εrob < 1.0 × 10
−6). The verification and authentica-
tion thresholds {Tv, Ta} of two-photon six-state (four-state)
QDS is {6.45%, 1.50%} ({4.05%, 1.20%}); {Tv, Ta} of six-
state and four-state in Scheme I (II) are {4.07%, 1.17%}
({4.275%, 1.20%}) and {3.46%, 1.12%} ({3.44%, 1.12%}), re-
spectively. The intensities of six-state for Scheme I are
µ = 0.34, ν = 0.16, ω = 0.01 and 0. The probabilities of
six-state for Scheme I are Pµ = 55%, Pν = 25%, Pω = 18%
and P0 = 2%. The intensities of four-state for Scheme I are
µ = 0.12, ν = 0.08, ω = 0.008 and 0. The probabilities of
four-state for Scheme I are Pµ = 52%, Pν = 23%, Pω = 23%
and P0 = 2%. The intensities of six-state for Scheme II are
µ1 = 0.17, ν1 = 0.08 and 0. The probabilities of six-state
for Scheme II are Pµ1µ1 = 57%, P0,µ1 = 1%, Pµ1,0 = 1%,
Pν1,ν1 = 30%, P0,ν1 = 5%, Pν1,0 = 5% and P00 = 1%.
The intensities of four-state for Scheme II are µ1 = 0.075,
ν1 = 0.04 and 0. The probabilities of four-state for Scheme
II are Pµ1µ1 = 60%, P0,µ1 = 1%, Pµ1,0 = 1%, Pν1,ν1 = 27%,
P0,ν1 = 5%, Pν1,0 = 5% and P00 = 1%.
(AM) to randomly prepare weak coherent state pulses
with four intensities, µ, ν, ω, 0 (µ > ν > ω > 0).
Their probability distributions are set as Pµ, Pν , Pω
and P0. Two copies of quantum states can be gener-
ated by 50:50 beam splitter (BS). The phases of Al-
ice’s signal laser pulses can be internally modulated
[29], which guarantees the security against unambiguous-
state-discrimination attack [30]. In the distribution stage
of Scheme II, with a 50:50 BS and two AMs, two copies of
weak coherent state pulses are generated and utilized to
modulate the following seven sets of intensities: {µ1, µ1},
{µ1, 0}, {0, µ1}, {ν1, ν1}, {ν1, 0}, {0, ν1} and {0, 0} with
µ1 > ν1 > 0. Their probability distributions are set as
Pµ1µ1 , Pµ10, P0µ1 , Pν1ν1 , Pν10, P0ν1 and P00. We de-
fine {µ1, µ1} as the signal-state set, while other six sets
compose the decoy-state set. In the estimation stage of
5Scheme I (II), Alice announces the intensity information
of each pulse, the polarization information of all decoy
states (decoy-state sets), and a portion β of the signal
state (signal-state set) that is randomly selected by Bob
or Charlie. For the signal state (signal-state set), the
β portion of data are regarded as test bits, while the
remaining ones are untested bits to be used in the mes-
saging stage.
The randomly selected test bits are used to defeat the
repudiation attack. The decoy-state method is used to
estimate the yield and bit error rate of two-photon com-
ponent, which are exploited to defeat the forgery attack.
For Alice’s repudiation attack, the decoy-state method
does not bring any advantage because the decoy state
data are not used for test bits. For Bob’s forgery attack,
the decoy-state method cannot bring any advantage since
the decoy states are randomly prepared by Alice. The
standard error analysis method [31] is used for estimat-
ing the statistical fluctuation in the decoy-state method.
We remark that the roles of Bob and Charlie in Scheme I
(II) are equivalent, either can be the authenticator. De-
tailed analysis and calculations are shown in Appendix
C.
We simulate the signature rates R of our QDS schemes
as functions of total secure transmission distance L, as
shown in Fig. 2. Here, the signature rate is defined as
R = 1/(2N) because we employ 2N qubit states to sign
one bit of classical message. We consider the symmetric
case where the distance between Alice and Bob (Charlie)
is L/2. For weak coherent states in Schemes I and II, we
present an analytical method to estimate the parameters
of two-photon component. Figure 2 also shows signa-
ture rates of four-state QDS for comparison. The linear
optical elements and threshold single-photon detectors
constituting measurement devices are used in our QDS
schemes by the universal squash model [32]. The detec-
tor error model [33] is applied to calculate the detection
probability and error rate of quantum states. Accord-
ing to the simulation result, if we consider the system
with 10 GHz clock rate and six-state polarization encod-
ing, we can generate a signature rate of 294 bps for a
channel length of 100km with two copies of single-photon
source, 0.78 bps (1.12 bps) for Scheme I (II) with phase-
randomized weak coherent states over the same distance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a QDS protocol with the im-
mediate feasibility of implementing it over a distance of
more than 100 km. The signature rate in our protocol can
achieve better performance at longer distance than previ-
ous protocols due to, among others, the Chernoff bound
and the decoy-state method. We anticipate that the sig-
nature rate could be significantly increased by adopting
tighter bound in the sampling theory, e.g., the tighter
Chernoff bound in [29]. Similar to QKD, any photon-
number distribution source, such as the coherent-state
superpositions [34], can be used for QDS. It may not be
easily generalized to more participants with the scheme
in this paper. In QDS with more participants, other as-
pects should be considered, such as colluding attack [5],
efficiency and resource, which should be studied in the fu-
ture. We remark that after submitting our manuscript,
we became aware of another independent work imple-
menting QDS with unauthenticated quantum channels,
however, it still requires secure classical channels [17].
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Appendix A: DETAILED SECURITY ANALYSIS
1. Security against repudiation
In a repudiation case, the dishonest signer Alice suc-
cessfully cheats two honest recipients Bob and Charlie.
Here, Charlie selects the test bits which can be regarded
as the random sampling since Charlie is an honest partic-
ipant. We exploit the technique introduced in Ref. [8] to
prove that the general quantum repudiation attack (i.e.,
coherent attack) relative to individual repudiation attack
does not provide any advantage. For each possible future
message to be signed, m = 0 and m = 1, Alice sends N
quantum states ρB1,C1,...,BNCN (arbitrary form) to Bob
and Charlie, respectively. Therein, M quantum states
are received both by Bob and Charlie. Bob and Charlie
directly measure the received quantum states and store
them as classical bits. Charlie randomly selects Mt bits
from M bits as the test bits in the estimation stage. The
remaining Mu = M −Mt untested bits are used in the
messaging stage. If and only if both Bob and Charlie
receive a quantum state can the event be used for pro-
viding the security against repudiation. Otherwise, Alice
can simply make Bob accept the message but Charlie re-
ject it. In the six-state QDS, for each received quantum
state, the probability is P c = 1/6 that Bob (Charlie) has
a conclusive result combining with the set of quantum
state in the ideal case (P c = 1/4 for four-state QDS).
Alice is not able to know which quantum state can be
confirmed by Bob or Charlie. Therefore, from the per-
spective of Alice, she must treat each quantum state re-
ceived by Bob (Charlie) in the same way. We define 1(0)
as the event that the measurement result of Bob or Char-
lie mismatches (matches) Alice’s announcement. If Bob
or Charlie does not have a conclusive result, the result is
considered to match Alice’s announcement automatically.
We encode each matching result of Bob’s and Charlie’s
untested bits as classical-quantum state |ϕuB〉 and |ϕuC〉,
respectively, with ϕuB, ϕ
u
C = 0, 1.
6The classical-quantum state of matching outcomes of
Bob and Charlie used in the messaging stage can be writ-
ten as
ρuB =
∑
ϕu
B1
,...,ϕu
BMu
p(ϕuB1 , . . . , ϕ
u
BMu
)
Mu⊗
i=1
∣∣ϕuBi〉〈ϕuBi ∣∣,
ρuC =
∑
ϕuC1
,...,ϕuCMu
p(ϕuC1 , . . . , ϕ
u
CMu
)
Mu⊗
i=1
∣∣ϕuCi〉〈ϕuCi∣∣.
(A1)
The successful repudiation probability relies on the state
ρu,
ρu = ρuB ⊗ ρuC . (A2)
The repudiation process can be described by the follow-
ing classical-quantum state
Rep(ρu) = p(ρu)|Suc〉〈Suc|+ [1− p(ρu)]|Fai〉〈Fai|,
(A3)
where the orthogonal states |Suc〉 and |Fai〉 represent
success and failure of repudiation, respectively. The state
ρu is a convex combination of states,
ρu =
∑
ϕu
B1
,ϕu
C1
,...,ϕu
BMu
,ϕu
CMu
p(ϕuB1 , . . . , ϕ
u
BMu
)
p(ϕuC1 , . . . , ϕ
u
CMu
)
Mu⊗
i=1
∣∣ϕuBi〉〈ϕuBi ∣∣∣∣ϕuCi〉〈ϕuCi∣∣
=
∑
j
p(j)ρj .
(A4)
The successful repudiation probability is given by
Tr[|Suc〉〈Suc|Rep(ρu)]
= Tr

|Suc〉〈Suc|Rep

∑
j
p(j)ρj




=
∑
j
p(j)Tr[|Suc〉〈Suc|Rep(ρj)]
=
∑
j
p(j)p(ρj).
(A5)
Since
∑
j p(j)p(ρj) is a convex combination of probabili-
ties and
∑
j p(j) = 1, we have∑
j
p(j)p(ρj) ≤
∑
j
p(j)max
j
p(ρj) = max
j
p(ρj). (A6)
Therefore, the maximum value of the successful repudia-
tion probability is acquired based on one individual state
ρj . That is, the optimal individual repudiation attack
can give out the upper bound of the repudiation attack.
In the individual repudiation attack, Alice sends in-
dividual and possibly different quantum states to Bob
and Charlie. Each pair of the quantum states Bob and
Charlie receive are not correlated with others and not re-
quired to be identical. The matching result of Bob’s and
Charlie’s untested bits (used in the messaging stage) can
be regarded as independent Bernoulli random variables
that satisfy Pr(ϕuBi = 1) = p
i
B and Pr(ϕ
u
Ci
= 1) = piC ,
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Mu}. Let X¯B = 1/Mu
∑
i ϕ
u
Bi
and X¯C =
1/Mu
∑
i ϕ
u
Ci
, the expectation values of X¯B and X¯C are
denoted as PB = 1/Mu
∑
i p
i
B and PC = 1/Mu
∑
i p
i
C ,
respectively. An observed outcome of X¯B (X¯C) is repre-
sented as x¯B (x¯C).
If the authentication mismatching rate satisfies x¯B ≤
P cBTa (P
c
B represents the probability of Bob’s conclusive
results), Bob accepts the signed message. By exploiting
Chernoff Bound [24, 25], the probability of Bob accepting
(denoted as BA) a valid message can be given by
Pr(BA) = Pr(PB − x¯B ≥ PB − P cBTa)
≤ exp
[
− (PB − P
c
BTa)
2
2PB
Mu
]
,
(A7)
where Pr(BA) is a strictly decreasing function for pa-
rameter PB , 1 ≥ PB ≥ P cBTa. If the verification mis-
matching rate x¯C ≥ P cCTv (P cC represents the probabil-
ity of Charlie’s conclusive results), Charlie will reject the
signed message. By exploiting Chernoff Bound [24, 25],
the probability of Charlie rejecting (denoted as CR) a
valid message can be given by
Pr(CR) = Pr(x¯C − PC ≥ P cCTv − PC)
≤ exp
[
− (P
c
CTv − PC)2
3PC
Mu
]
,
(A8)
where Pr(BA) is a strictly increasing function for param-
eter PC , 0 < PC < P
c
CTv.
A successful repudiation means that Bob accepts the
signed message and Charlie rejects it. The probability
can be written as
Pr(BA,CR) ≤ sup{min{Pr(BA),Pr(CR)}}. (A9)
Under reasonable conditions, in order to make the value
of Pr(BA,CR) as large as possible, Alice will make the
parameter PC as large as possible and PB as small as
possible. Because we remove the SWAP test [6] and
symmetry operation (optical multiport) [8] (to guaran-
tee that the quantum states that Bob and Charlie receive
are identical), PB = PC will no longer be satisfied. How-
ever, we can restrict the difference between PC and PB.
Thereby, the upper bound of the successful repudiation
probability can be restricted.
For all quantum states received by both Bob and
Charlie, Bob (Charlie) records a string of data YB =
{yB1 , yB2 , . . . , yBM } (YC = {yC1, yC2 , . . . , yCM }). Here,
yBi represents the ith data and one has yBi ∈ {0, 1,⊥}.
yBi = 0, 1 (yBi =⊥) represents that Bob has a conclu-
sive (inconclusive) outcome. Let YtB (YtC) be the test bit
string which is a random sample of size Mt of YB (YC)
and the remaining untested bit string is YuB (YuC). Sim-
ilarly, the bit string of Alice is YA (YA = YtA
⋃YuA) and
7FIG. 3. (color online). Schematic representation of different
bit strings. The left black frame (right yellow frame) rectangle
represents the string of test (untested) bits. The horizontal
red shadow (vertical blue shadow) represents the bit string of
Bob’s (Charlie’s) conclusive results.
we have yAi ∈ {0, 1} for the quantum states prepared by
Alice. As is clear from the above descriptions, we have
ϕuBi = y
u
Ai
⊕yuBi and ϕuCi = yuAi⊕yuCi (0, 1 ⊕ ⊥:= 0). Let
YcB = YctB ∪ YcuB and YcC = YctC ∪ YcuC represent the bit
strings of Bob’s and Charlie’s conclusive results, respec-
tively. YcAB = YctAB ∪ YcuAB represents Alice announc-
ing the bit string corresponding to YcB = YctB ∪ YcuB ,
while YcAC = YctAC ∪ YcuAC represents Alice announcing
the bit string corresponding to YcC = YctC ∪ YcuC . Let
ZcB = ZctB ∪ ZcuB (ZcC = ZctC ∪ ZcuC ) represents the bit
string of Bob (Charlie) given that Bob and Charlie both
have conclusive results, and the corresponding bit string
of Alice is ZcA = ZctA ∪ ZcuA . A visualized schematic of
the relationship between the above bit strings are shown
in Fig. 3.
Exploiting relative Hamming distance and the random
sampling theorem, for the arbitrary bit string Alice an-
nounces, the expectation value ∆ can be given by
∆ = dH(ZcuB ,ZcuC ) ≥ dH(ZcuA ,ZcuC )− dH(ZcuA ,ZcuB )
= dH(YcuAC ,YcuC )− dH(YcuAB ,YcuB )
= dH(YuA,YuC)/P cC − dH(YuA,YuB)/P cB
= PC/P
c
C − PB/P cB.
(A10)
The test distance ∆t can be given by
∆t = dH(ZctB ,ZctC ) ≤ dH(ZctA ,ZctB ) + dH(ZctA ,ZctC )
= dH(YctAB ,YctB ) + dH(YctAC ,YctC ) = ecB + ecC .
(A11)
Here, ecB (e
c
C) is the mismatching rate between Bob’s
(Charlie’s) conclusive results of test bits and Alice’s an-
nouncement bits, which can be acquired in the estimation
stage. Taking into account the random sampling without
replacement theorem [22], we have
∆ = ∆t + δ2, δ2 =g[P
c
CP
c
BMu, P
c
CP
c
BMt,∆t, ǫ2],
(A12)
g(n, k, λ, ǫ¯) =
√
2(n+ k)λ(1 − λ)
nk
×
√
ln
√
n+ kC(n, k, λ)√
2πnkλ(1− λ)ǫ¯ ,
C(n, k, λ) =exp
( 1
8(n+ k)
+
1
12k
− 1
12kλ+ 1
− 1
12k(1− λ) + 1
)
.
(A13)
where ǫ2 is the failure probability, P
c
CP
c
BMu and
P cCP
c
BMt are the numbers of untested bits and test bits
given that both Bob and Charlie have the conclusive re-
sults, respectively.
From Eq. (A7)-Eq. (A9), we know that the optimal
probability that Bob accepts a message while Charlie re-
jects it is
ε2 = Pr(BA,CR) = exp
[
− (A− P
c
BTa)
2
2A
Mu
]
, (A14)
where A = PB is a physical solution of the following
equation and inequalities
(A− P cBTa)2
2A
=
[P cCTv − P cC (A/P cB +∆)]2
3P cC (A/P
c
B +∆)
,
P cBTa < A < P
c
B(Tv −∆).
(A15)
The protocol is with εnor-non-repudiation, where εnor =
ε2 + ǫ2.
2. Security against forgery
In a forgery case, the dishonest recipient, Bob, can suc-
cessfully deceive two honest participants, i.e., the signer
Alice and the other recipient Charlie. Bob authenticates
the validity of the message sent by Alice, while Charlie
verifies the validity of the message forwarded by Bob.
Here, the test bits Charlie selects can be regarded as
the random sampling since Charlie is an honest partici-
pant. The forgery is successful when Charlie accepts (de-
noted as CA) the forged (tampered) message forwarded
by Bob. For all conclusive measurement outcomes of the
untested bits, Charlie records a string of data YcuC =
{ycuC1, ycuC2 , . . . , ycuCLc}, where Lc = P cCMu is the num-
ber of conclusive measurement outcomes of the untested
bits. It is obvious to see YcuC ⊆ YuC and ycuCi ∈ {0, 1}
for i ∈ {1, . . . , Lc}. Let YcuBF = {ycuBF1 , ycuBF2 , . . . , ycuBFLc}
represents the bit string Bob forwards corresponding to
YcuC . We consider the case that Bob is restricted to col-
lective forgery attack in which his optimal strategy is to
correctly guess the information of each quantum state as
much as possible. We assume that the upper bound of
Bob’s information IBC about Charlie’s conclusive result
bits can be acquired with failure probability ǫ1. Note that
the values of estimating the information are different for
various protocols and will be analyzed in the following
8section. Let Sc be the mismatching rate between YcuBF
and YcuC . In order to optimally implement the forgery
attack, Bob will make Sc reach the minimum value with
IBC . So the minimum mismatching rate Sc can be given
by [19, 23]
H(Sc) ≥ Hmax(C|B) ≥ Hmin(C|B) = 1− IBC , (A16)
where H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy function. The max-entropy Hmax(C|B) is upper
bounded by the minimum number of bits of additional
information about YcuC which are needed to perfectly re-
construct YcuC from YcuBF . The min-entropy Hmin(C|B)
quantifies the minimum uncertainty that Bob has about
YcuC using the optimal attack strategy.
Let X cC = {ϕcuC1 , ϕcuC2 , . . . , ϕcuCLc} be a set of independent
Bernoulli random variables which represent the matching
results between Charlie’s conclusive measurement out-
comes of the untested bits and those Bob forwards, i.e.,
ϕcuCi = y
cu
Ci
⊕ ycuBFi . Let X¯cC = 1/Lc
∑
i ϕ
cu
Ci
, the expec-
tation value of X¯cC can be given by E[X¯
c
C ] = Sc. An
observed outcome of X¯cC is represented as x¯
c
C . If the
verification mismatching rate satisfies x¯cC ≤ Tv, Charlie
accepts the forged message. There is no chance that Bob
successfully forges in the ideal conditions when the veri-
fication threshold of Charlie satisfies Tv < Sc. However,
considering the sampling with the case of finite number
of independent Bernoulli random values, the observed av-
erage value can be less than the expectation value with
a negligible probability. The probability that Charlie ac-
cepts (denoted as CA) a forged message can be given
by
ε1 = Pr(CA) = Pr(Sc − x¯cC ≥ Sc − Tv)
≤ exp[− (Sc − Tv)
2
2Sc
Lc]
= exp[− (Sc − Tv)
2
2Sc
P cCMu].
(A17)
The protocol is with εunf-unforgeability, where εunf =
ε1 + ǫ1. Therefore, the security level of the QDS can be
given by
εsec = εnor + εunf
= ε1 + ε2 + ǫ1 + ǫ2.
(A18)
3. The robustness
εrob is the probability that the protocol is aborted
when the adversary is inactive. In the estimation stage,
let ecB be the mismatching rate of conclusive results of
Bob’s test bits. Exploiting random sampling without re-
placement theorem [22], in the messaging stage, the mis-
matching rate EcB of conclusive results of Bob’s untested
bits can be given by (with no adversary existing)
EcB = e
c
B + g[P
c
BMu, P
c
BMt, e
c
B, ε
′], (A19)
where ε′ is the failure probability, P cBMu and P
c
BMt are
the numbers of untested bits and test bits given that Bob
has conclusive results, respectively. If one has EB > Ta,
Bob rejects (denoted as BR) the message sent by Alice.
The probability can be written as
εrob = Pr(BR) < ε
′ =h(P cBMu, P
c
BMt, E
c
B, Ta − EcB),
h(n, k, λ, t) =
exp[− nkt22(n+k)λ(1−λ) ]C(n, k, λ)√
2πnkλ(1− λ)/(n+ k) ,
(A20)
Appendix B: Two copies of single-photon states
In the following, we analyze Bob’s information IBC
about Charlie’s conclusive result bits in the two-photon
six-state (four-state) QDS in detail. Besides, we calculate
the signature rate and the corresponding security bound
in the practical fiber-based protocol.
We consider the case that Bob is restricted to collec-
tive forgery attack in which his optimal strategy is to
correctly guess the information of each quantum state as
much as possible. Therefore, the attack strategy of Bob
in two-photon six-state QDS protocol is equivalent to the
eavesdropping attack of Eve in the six-state SARG04-
QKD protocol [20, 21] given that the two-photon source
has been taken into account (In the QKD protocol, the
two communication parties, Alice and Bob, trust each
other while the eavesdropper Eve is the untrusted ad-
versary). In the unconditionally secure SARG04-QKD
protocol [21], an virtual entanglement-based protocol is
proposed. Exploiting the unconditionally secure entan-
glement distillation protocol with two-photon, the upper
bound of IBC = IE = H(ep|eb) can be estimated [11].
The relationship between phase error rate ep and bit er-
ror rate eb with the six-state SARG04-QKD [21] cannot
be provided. Therefore, we generalize the method pro-
posed in Ref [21] to find out the relationship.
Some notations should be defined. The four quantum
states are written as |ϕ0〉 = cos pi8 |0x〉+ sin pi8 |1x〉, |ϕ¯0〉 =− sin pi8 |0x〉 + cos pi8 |1x〉, |ϕ1〉 = cos pi8 |0x〉 − sin pi8 |1x〉 and|ϕ¯1〉 = sin pi8 |0x〉 + cos pi8 |1x〉. Therein, |ϕ¯0〉 and |ϕ0〉
are eigenstates of basis Z+X√
2
, |ϕ¯1〉 and |ϕ1〉 are eigen-
states of basis Z−X√
2
. A filtering operator reads F =
sin pi8 |0x〉〈0x|+cos pi8 |1x〉〈1x| and a −pi2 rotation around Y
basis reads R = cos pi4 I + sin
pi
4 (|1x〉〈0x| − |0x〉〈1x|), note
that R|ϕ1〉 = |ϕ0〉. T0 = I represents an identity oper-
ator, T1 = cos
pi
4 I − i sin pi4 Z+X√2 represents a
pi
2 rotation
around Z+X√
2
basis, T2 = cos
pi
4 I − i sin pi4 Z−X√2 represents
a pi2 rotation around
Z−X√
2
basis.
The entanglement-based protocol can be describe
in the following [21]. For each quantum sig-
nal, Alice prepares an entangled state |ΨAB〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B |ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B|ϕ1〉B). Alice ran-
domly applies a rotation TlR
k to system B, with l ∈
{0, 1, 2} and k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, then she sends system B
9to Bob through the insecure (unauthenticated) quantum
channel. After some possible intervention from Eve, Bob
receives the quantum state. Bob randomly applies the
rotation R−k
′
T−1l′ to the qubit state and a filtering oper-
ation whose successful operation is descried by Kraus op-
erator F . A successful filtering corresponds to a conclu-
sive result of Bob. Alice and Bob then publicly announce
{k, l} and {k′, l′}, meanwhile, they keep the quantum
states with k = k′, l = l′. Bob randomly chooses some
quantum states as test bits. Alice and Charlie measure
them in Z basis. Then, they compare the partial mea-
surement outcomes to estimate bit error rates and the
information that Eve acquires.
Let ρqubit represents a pair of qubit states that Alice
and Bob share, which can be given by
ρqubit =
∑
l,k
Pˆ [IA ⊗ (
∑
u
FR−kB T
−1
lB
EuBTlBR
k
B)|ξl,k,u〉],
(B1)
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1} and
|ξl,k,u〉 = 1√
2
[〈ux|TlRk|ϕ0〉|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B
+ 〈ux|TlRk|ϕ1〉|1z〉A|ϕ1〉B],
EuB = 〈0x|EB|ux〉, Pˆ (X |Ψ〉) = X |Ψ〉〈Ψ|X†.
(B2)
EB is a 4 × 4 matrix which depends on Eve’s operation
and we can safely assume that the final state of Eve’s
system is a particular state |0x〉. The probabilities of bit
flip and phase shift can be given by
pbit = PX + PY ,
pph = PZ + PY ,
(B3)
where
PX = Tr[ρqubit|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|],
PY = Tr[ρqubit|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|],
PZ = Tr[ρqubit|Φ−〉〈Φ−|].
(B4)
If Cpbit+C
′pfil ≥ pph holds, then Ceb+C′ ≥ ep is expo-
nentially reliable as the number of successfully filtering
states increases [21]. pfil = Tr[ρqubit] is the trace of state
ρqubit. It is very clear to see that pfil, pbit and pph are
the functions of eight elements and their conjugates, i.e.,
pfil = ~c
∗Afil~cT , pbit = ~c∗Abit~cT and pph = ~c∗Aph~cT . Afil,
Abit, and Aph are 8× 8 matrices, the eight elements in ~c
are directly taken from EB . If CAbit+C
′Afil−Aph ≥ 0 is
a positive semi-definite matrix, Cpbit + C
′pfil ≥ pph will
always be satisfied. After a complex calculation accord-
ing to the above formulas, we can acquire the relationship
between phase error rate and bit error rate
ep =
2−√2
4
+
3
2
√
2
eb, (B5)
in the two-photon six-state SARG04-QKD. Therein, the
probability that both bit and phase occur error is PY =
4+
√
2
8 eb. With the same method, for the single-photon
six-state SARG04-QKD, we have ep =
3
2eb and PY =
3
4eb. In the asymptotic case, IBC can be given by
IBC =IE = H(ep|eb)
=− (1 + a− eb − ep) log2
1 + a− eb − ep
1− eb
− (ep − a) log2
ep − a
1− eb − (eb − a) log2
eb − a
eb
− a log2
a
eb
,
(B6)
where H(ep|eb) is the conditional Shannon entropy func-
tion, a = PY =
4+
√
2
8 eb quantifies the mutual information
between bit and phase errors.
In the two-photon four-state QDS scheme, there are
four single-photon BB84 quantum states |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉 =
(|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2, |−〉 = (|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2. The four
states can be divided into four sets {|H〉, |+〉}, {|+〉, |V 〉},
{|V 〉, |−〉}, {|−〉, |H〉}, where the first state from each set
represents logic 0 and the second state logic 1. In ad-
dition to the preparation of quantum states, other pro-
cesses are the same with the two-photon six-state QDS
scheme. The entanglement distillation protocol can be
converted to the unconditionally secure two-photon four-
state SARG04-QKD. In the asymptotic case, the rela-
tionship between the phase error rate and the bit error
rate can be given by [21]
ep = min
x
{
xeb +
3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2
6
}
, ∀x.
(B7)
Meanwhile, we can set a = PY = eb × ep, which corre-
sponds to no mutual information between bit and phase
errors.
Hereafter, the detector error model [33] is applied to
estimate the detection probability and error rate of quan-
tum states. In the simulation, we simply apply the case
that Alice and Bob do not interfere with the protocol.
The overall gain Q can be given by
Q = [1− (1− Y0)(1 − ηB)][1 − (1− Y0)(1 − ηC)], (B8)
which indicates the ratio of the number of Bob’s and
Charlie’s detection coincidence events to Alice’s number
of emitted signals. Y0 represents the probability that
Bob’s (Charlie’s) detector clicks when the input of Bob
(Charlie) is a vacuum state. Because of active basis se-
lection, we have Y0 = 2pd(1−pd), where pd represents the
dark count rate of each detector. ηB = ηd × 10−αLAB/10
(ηC = ηd × 10−αLAC/10) represents the transmission effi-
ciency from Alice to Bob (Charlie). Here, we consider a
widely used fiber-based setup model. Therein, ηd repre-
sents the detection efficiency, LAB (LAC) is the distance
between Alice and Bob (Charlie), α is the intrinsic loss
coefficient of the fiber. Taking into account the universal
squash model [32], the threshold single-photon detector
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can be used in our scheme. The gain of Bob’s conclusive
results and Charlie’s conclusive results are given by
QcB = z[(1− ηB)Y0 + (
1
2
+ ed)ηB ][1− (1− Y0)(1 − ηC)]
= P cBQ,
QcC = z[(1− ηC)Y0 + (
1
2
+ ed)ηC ][1− (1− Y0)(1− ηB)]
= P cCQ,
(B9)
where ed represents the misalignment in the channel, for
six-state scheme, z = 13 , for four-state scheme, z =
1
2 .
The overall quantum bit error rate (QBER) of Bob’s con-
clusive results and Charlie’s conclusive results are given
by
ecBQ
c
B = z[
1
2
(1 − ηB)Y0 + edηB][1− (1− Y0)(1− ηC)],
ecCQ
c
C = z[
1
2
(1− ηC)Y0 + edηC ][1− (1− Y0)(1 − ηB)],
(B10)
The amount of Charlie’s randomly selected test bits is
Mt = βQN , the remaining bits Mu = (1 − β)QN are
untested bits. In the QDS protocol, eb is the expecta-
tion value of mismatching rate between Alice’s bits and
Charlie’s conclusive result bits in the untested portion.
Therefore eb = e
c
C + δ1, δ1 is the finite sample size effect
which can be quantified by the random sampling with-
out replacement theorem [22] with failure probability ǫ1.
Therefore, we have
δ1 = g[P
c
CMu, P
c
CMt, e
c
C , ǫ1]. (B11)
Note that the security thresholds satisfy Ta < Tv < Sc,
the supremum of Sc can be given by
H(sup{Sc}) = 1−H(inf{ep|eb}),
= 1−H(2−
√
2
4
).
(B12)
It is obvious to see that the supremum of Sc is 7.9135%
in the two-photon four-state QDS, which is equal to that
in the two-photon six-state QDS. However, the six-state
scheme is more robust than the one with four-state, for
instance, given eb = 1%, one has Sc = 7.4564% for six-
state and Sc = 4.5035% for four-state.
Appendix C: Weak coherent states
1. Practical QDS with Scheme I
Note that in the case of repudiation, the dishonest
signer Alice successfully cheats two honest recipients Bob
and Charlie. Thus, the test bits Charlie or Bob select can
be regarded as the random sampling since Charlie (Bob)
is honest in the repudiation case. Therefore the test bits
can be used for the security against the repudiation at-
tack. In the case of forgery, only one recipient is dishonest
while the signer is honest. The decoy states are randomly
prepared by Alice which can be used to prove the secu-
rity against forgery attack. Therefore, the roles of Bob
and Charlie are equivalent in the decoy-state-based QDS
protocol, both Bob and Charlie could be the authentica-
tor.
The overall gain Qλ can be given by
Qλ = [1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηB ][1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηC ], (C1)
where λ ∈ {µ, ν, ω, 0}. The gain of Bob’s conclusive re-
sults and Charlie’s conclusive results are given by
QcBλ =z[Y0e
−λ
2
ηB + (
1
2
+ ed)(1− e−λ2 ηB )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηC ] = P cBλQλ,
QcCλ =z[Y0e
−λ
2
ηC + (
1
2
+ ed)(1− e−λ2 ηC )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηB ] = P cCλQλ
=
∞∑
n=0
e−λ
λn
n!
YCn,
(C2)
where YCn is the yield given that Alice sends n-photon
pulse, both Bob’s and Charlie’s detectors click and Char-
lie has a conclusive result. The overall QBER of Bob’s
conclusive results and Charlie’s conclusive results are
given by
ecBλQ
c
Bλ =z[
1
2
e−
λ
2
ηBY0 + ed(1− e−λ2 ηB )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηC ],
ecCλQ
c
Cλ =z[
1
2
e−
λ
2
ηCY0 + ed(1− e−λ2 ηC )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−λ2 ηB ]
=
∞∑
n=0
e−λ
λn
n!
eCnYCn,
(C3)
where eCn is the QBER of n-photon given that Alice
sends n-photon pulse, both Bob’s and Charlie’s detec-
tors click and Charlie has a conclusive result. Exploiting
the decoy-state method [26, 27], the yield YC2 and QBER
eC2 of two-photon components in signal-state can be es-
timated. The lower bound of YC2 and upper bound of
eC2 can be given by
YC2 ≥ 2
µνω(µ− ν)(µ− ω)(ν − ω)
{
µω(µ2 − ω2)eνQcCν
− µν(µ2 − ν2)eωQcCω − νω(ν2 − ω2)eµQcCµ
+
[
µ3(ν − ω) + ν3(ω − µ) + ω3(µ− ν)]QcC0},
eC2 ≤ 2
νω(ν − ω)YC2
[
ωeνecCνQ
c
Cν − νeωecCωQcCω
− (ω − ν)ecC0QcC0
]
.
(C4)
In the decoy-state method, the finite sample size effect
should be taken into account. We exploit the standard
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error analysis method [31] to calculate the statistical fluc-
tuation. Thus, we have
(QcCλ)
U/L = QcCλ
(
1± nα1√
NλQcCλ
)
, (C5)
where Nλ is the number of pulses given that Alice sends
weak coherent states with intensity λ. NλQ
c
Cλ is the
number of pulses given that Alice sends weak coherent
states with intensity λ and Charlie has a conclusive re-
sult. Thus, we have Nλ = PλN and Pλ is the probability
of intensity λ.
Only the contribution of signal-state can be used as
test bits and untested bits. The amount of Charlie’s ran-
domly selected test bits isMt = βQµPµN , the remaining
bitsMu = (1−β)QµPµN are untested bits. The distance
∆ is written as
∆ = ∆t + δ2, ∆t = e
c
Bµ + e
c
Cµ,
δ2 = g[P
c
CP
c
BMu, P
c
CP
c
BMt,∆t, ǫ2].
(C6)
Because an unambiguous discrimination among C lin-
early dependent states of a qubit space is only possible
when at least C − 1 copies of the states are available
[18]. In the six-state QDS with phase-randomized weak
coherent states, Bob cannot unambiguously discriminate
the polarization states when Alice sends 3-photon or 4-
photon pulses. For simplicity, we only consider the con-
tribution of the two-photon component. For vacuum-
state and single-photon component, there is a negligible
probability to indicate a successful event due to the low
dark count rate. Therefore, we can assume that Bob can
guess the bits of Charlie’s conclusive results without er-
rors unless Alice sends two-photon component pulses.
The optimal probability of Bob accepting the message
while Charlie rejecting is
ε2 = Pr(BA,CR) = exp[−
(A− P cBµTa)2
2A
Mu], (C7)
where A is the physical solution of the following equation
and inequalities,
(A− P cBµTa)2
2A
=
[
P cCµTv − P cCµ
(
A/P cBµ +∆
)]2
3P cCµ
(
A/P cBµ +∆
) ,
P cBµTa < A < P
c
Bµ(Tv −∆).
(C8)
The optimal probability of Charlie accepting a forged
message is
ε1 = Pr(CA) = exp
[
− (Sc − Tv2)
2
2Sc
QLC2
QcCµ
P cCµMu
]
,
(C9)
where
QLC2
Qc
Cµ
P cCµMu is the minimum number of Charlie’s
conclusive result bits in the untested bits given that Alice
sends two-photon component pulses, and
Tv2 = Tv
QcCµ
QLC2
, QLC2 = e
−µµ
2
2
Y LC2. (C10)
Tv2 and Q
L
C2 are the mismatching rate threshold and the
gain (lower bound) of the two-photon component, respec-
tively. The security level of the protocol can be written
as
εsec = εnor + εunf
= ε1 + ε2 + ǫ2 + 7ǫ3,
(C11)
where 7ǫ3 is the failure probability due to the decoy-state
method, and
ǫ3 =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
nα1
e−
t2
2 dt, (C12)
nα1 is the number of standard deviations, we set nα1 =
4.753 for simulation. The probability of the robustness
is
εrob = Pr(BR) < ε
′
= h[P cBµMu, P
c
BµMt, e
c
Bµ, Ta − ecBµ].
(C13)
2. Practical QDS with Scheme II
The overall gain Qγχ can be given by
Qγχ = [1− (1− Y0)e−γηB ][1− (1− Y0)e−χηC ], (C14)
where {γ, χ} = {µ1, µ1}, {µ1, 0}, {0, µ1}, {ν1, ν1},
{ν1, 0}, {0, ν1} and {0, 0}. The gain of Bob’s conclusive
results and Charlie’s conclusive results can be written as
QcBγχ =z[Y0e
−γηB + (
1
2
+ ed)(1 − e−γηB )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−χηC ] = P cBγχQγχ,
QcCγχ =z[Y0e
−χηC + (
1
2
+ ed)(1− e−χηC )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−γηB ] = P cCγχQγχ
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
e−γ
γn
n!
e−χ
χm
m!
YCnm,
(C15)
where YCnm is the yield that both Bob’s and Charlie’s
detectors click and Charlie has a conclusive result given
that Alice sends n-photon pulses to Bob and m-photon
pulses to Charlie. The overall QBER of Bob’s conclusive
results and Charlie’s conclusive results are given by
ecBγχQ
c
Bγχ =z[
1
2
e−γηBY0 + ed(1− e−γηB)]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−χηC ],
ecCγχQ
c
Cγχ =z[
1
2
e−χηCY0 + ed(1− e−χηC )]
× [1− (1− Y0)e−γηB ]
=
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
e−γ
γn
n!
e−χ
χm
m!
eCnmYCnm,
(C16)
where eCnm is the QBER. Exploiting the decoy-state
method [26, 27], the yield YC11 and QBER eC11 of the
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two-photon component in the signal-state set can be esti-
mated. It is clear that the estimation of YC11 and eC11 is
similar to that used in measurement-device-independent
QKD [29]. So YC11 and eC11 can be written as [14, 29]
YC11 ≥ 1
µ21ν
2
1 (µ1 − ν1)
×
{
µ31(e
2ν1QcCν1ν1 − eν1QcCν10 − eν1QcC0ν1)
− ν31(e2µ1QcCµ1µ1 − eµ1QcCµ10 − eµ1QcC0µ1)
+ (µ31 − ν31)QcC00
}
(C17)
and
eC11 ≤ 1
ν21YC11
(
e2ν1ecCν1ν1Q
c
Cν1ν1 − eν1ecCν10QcCν10
− eν1ecC0ν1QcC0ν1 + ecC00QcC00
)
.
(C18)
We exploit the standard error analysis method to calcu-
late the statistical fluctuation. Thus, we have
(QcCγχ)
U/L = QcCγχ

1± nα2√
NγχQcCγχ

 . (C19)
Here, Nγχ is the number of pulses given that Alice sends
weak coherent states with intensity set {γ, χ}. Thus,
Nγχ = PγχN and Pγχ is the probability of intensity set
{γ, χ}.
Only the contribution of signal-state set can be used as
test bits and untested bits. The amount of Charlie’s ran-
dom selected test bits is Mt = βQµ1µ1Pµ1µ1N , and the
remaining bits Mu = (1 − β)Qµ1µ1Pµ1µ1N are untested
bits. The distance ∆ is written as
∆ = ∆t + δ2, ∆t = e
c
Bµ1µ1 + e
c
Cµ1µ1 ,
δ2 = g[P
c
CP
c
BMu, P
c
CP
c
BMt,∆t, ǫ2].
(C20)
The optimal probability of Bob accepting the message
while Charlie rejecting is
ε2 = Pr(BA,CR) = exp[−
(A− P cBµ1µ1Ta)2
2A
Mu],
(C21)
where A is the physical solution of the following equation
and inequalities,
(A− P cBµ1µ1Ta)2
2A
=
[
P cCµ1µ1Tv − P cCµ1µ1
(
A/P cBµ1µ1 +∆
)]2
3P cCµ1µ1
(
A/P cBµ1µ1 +∆
) ,
P cBµ1µ1Ta < A < P
c
Bµ1µ1(Tv −∆).
(C22)
The optimal probability of Charlie accepting a forged
message is
ε1 = Pr(CA)
= exp
[
− (Sc − Tv11)
2
2Sc
QLC11
QcCµ1µ1
P cCµ1µ1Mu
]
,
(C23)
where
QLC11
Qc
Cµ1µ1
P cCµ1µ1Mu is the minimum number of Char-
lie’s conclusive result bits in the untested bits given that
Alice sends two-photon component pulses, and
Tv11 = Tv
QcCµ1µ1
QLC11
, QLC11 = e
−2µ1µ21Y
L
C11, (C24)
Tv11 and Q
L
C11 are the mismatching rate threshold and
the gain (lower bound), respectively. The security level
of the protocol can be written as
εsec = εnor + εunf
= ε1 + ε2 + ǫ2 + 11ǫ4.
(C25)
where 11ǫ4 is the failure probability due to the decoy-
state method, and
ǫ4 =
1√
2π
∫ ∞
nα2
e−
t2
2 dt, (C26)
nα2 is the number of standard deviations and we set
nα2 = 4.845 for simulation.
The probability of the robustness is
εrob = Pr(BR) < ε
′
= h[P cBµ1µ1Mu, P
c
Bµ1µ1Mt, e
c
Bµ1µ1 , Ta − ecBµ1µ1 ].
(C27)
3. Decoy-state method cannot help the adversary
For Alice’s repudiation attack, the dishonest signer
Alice attempts to cheat two honest recipients Bob and
Charlie. Since quantum states are prepared by Alice,
multi-photon component will provide no advantages for
Alice. Only the contribution of signal-state (set) can be
use as test bits and untested bits in the QDS with phase-
randomized weak coherent states. The security analysis
of repudiation attack does not use the information of the
decoy-state. Therefore, the decoy-state method does not
bring any advantage for Alice’s repudiation.
In the case of Bob’s forgery attack, the dishonest au-
thenticator Bob attempts to cheat the honest signer Alice
and the honest verifier Charlie. The decoy-state method
is used to estimate the yield and bit error rate of two-
photon component sent by Alice given that Charlie has a
conclusive result. Furthermore, the decoy-state method
is used to estimate the minimum number (maximum
average information IBC) of Charlie’s conclusive result
bits given that Alice sends two-photon component pulses,
which is used for security against forgery attack. Thus,
Alice and Charlie are honest and they trust each other
while Bob is dishonest in the decoy-state method. We
recall the decoy-state QKD [26, 27] that two communi-
cation parties trust each other while the eavesdropper
Eve is an untrusted adversary. Bob is an active partici-
pant in the QDS scheme, i.e., he will announce the result
whether his detector has a click. Meanwhile, Bob can
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exploit the insecure quantum channel to decide which
qubit (location) has the chance to be detected by Char-
lie. The above two aspects are equivalent to that Bob
can decide the effective event. In the QKD protocol, Eve
can also decide which qubit (location) has the chance to
be detected by the receiver as the effective event, such as
the photon-number-splitting attack [35]. Therefore, the
decoy-state method cannot bring any advantage for Bob
to forge in the QDS.
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